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NOTE
Employment Law: The Employer Escape Chute from

Punitive Liability Under Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass'n

In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n,' the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated a
recurring message for labor and employment attorneys - advise your clients of
the necessity of preventing workplace discrimination and harassment by adopting,
implementing, and enforcing strong anti-discrimination policies. Not only do such
policies bring employers a multitude of nonlegal benefits,' but clear antidiscrimination policies also yield employers the legal advantage of an escape
chute from vicarious and punitive liability for the discriminatory and/or harassing
conduct of their supervisory and managerial employees.'
The Supreme Court's ruling in Kolstad from the 1999 Term, coupled with
decisions from the 1998 Term4 regarding employment discrimination,
demonstrates the necessity for employers to implement clear guidelines aimed at
preventing harassment and discrimination within the workplace. Failure to
implement and enforce these policies can lead to courts holding employers
vicariously liable for the harassing conduct of their supervisory employees This

1. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).

2. Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., ComplianceProgramsHelp Cut Bias Risk: Supreme CourtRuling Shows
Good-FaithEfforts are Key for Employers in DefendingAgainst DiscriminationSuits, Bus. INs., Aug.
23, 1999, at 17, available at 1999 WL 8769146 (recognizing certain benefits of effective antidiscrimination workplace policies). These benefits include: gaining or retaining competitive industry
advantage by maximizing employee productivity; solidifying company's reputation as an "employer of
choice" among potential applicants and existing workforce; maintaining an optimal work environment
for the company's employees; avoiding negative publicity stemming from employment discrimination
problems; avoiding the drain of corporate balance sheets and the diversion of management time from
company operations caused by employment-related disputes. Id.
3. Beverly Bryan Swallows, Reducing Legal Risk andAvoidingEmployment DiscriminationClaims,
FRANCHISE LJ., Summer 1999, at 9 ("A proactive and thoughtful approach to discrimination awareness
and avoidance will ... increase the likelihood of success when defending litigation about employment
decisions.'); Maatman, supranote 2 (stating that anti-discrimination policies provide employers a sound
defense against exposure to liability for punitive damages stemming from all types of employment
discrimination and harassment litigation); Robert P. Lewis, Supreme Court Sets Standardfor Punitive
Damages UnderTitle VII, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 15, 1999, at I (stating that, subsequent to Kolstad, "employers
who have not yet implemented antidiscrimination policies and programs, in spite of Burlington and
Faragher,now have an additional reason to do so").
4. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
5. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763-65; Faragher,524 U.S. at 807 (defining standard for holding employer
liable for supervisors' conduct in sexual harassment of employees).
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liability can also cost employers significant punitive damages.6 However, recent
Supreme Court rulings provide an escape from these liabilities if employers
develop and enact company-wide anti-discrimination policies."
For example, in the 1998 cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth8 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,9 the Supreme Court provided employers an
affirmative defense to vicarious liability for the harassing conduct of supervisors.
To invoke the defense, the employer must show: "(a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,
and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise."'0 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) clarified
the "reasonable care" requirement of this affirmative defense by specifying the
essential elements to include in company anti-harassment policies" and the
appropriate steps to implement such policies. 2

6. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536 (defining standard for holding employer liable for punitive damages).
7. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (outlining employer's affirmative defense to vicarious liability for
supervisor conduct); Faragher,524 U.S. at 807-08 (same); see also Kolstad,527 U.S. at 544 (outlining
employer's good-faith-compliance defense from punitive liability). Regarding the Kolstad punitive
damages defense, one employment law newsletter tells employers that they can now "breathe a little
easier," as long as they have adopted and implemented anti-discrimination policies and educated their
workforce and continue to keep an ever-vigilant eye over workplace discrimination. High CourtEnds
Term with Important Rulings on ADA, Punitive Damages, N.H. EMPLOYMENT L. LETrER (Sulloway &
Hollis), Aug. 1999, at 6 [hereinafter High Court].
8. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
9. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
10. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.
11. The guidelines suggest the following as essential elements of an anti-harassment policy:
* A clear explanation of prohibited conduct;
* Assurance that employees who make complaints of harassment or provide
information related to such complaints will be protected against retaliation;
- A clearly described complaint process that provides accessible avenues of
complaint;
- Assurance that the employer will protect the confidentiality of harassment
complaints to the extent possible;
- A complaint process that provides a prompt, thorough, and impartial investigation;
and
. Assurance that the employer will take immediate and appropriate corrective action
when it determines that harassment has occurred.
EEOC Notice, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Uability for Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors § V(C)(l) (June 18, 1999), available at http:llwww.eeoc.gov/docsliarrassment.html
[hereinafter EEOC Notice].
12. The guidelines provide that an employer should provide every employee with a copy of the antiharassment policy and should redistribute the policy regularly. The policy should be written in language
easily understood by employees, posted in frequented areas within the workplace, and included in
employee handbooks. Id. § V(C)(1).
Besides drafting and enforcing company policies, the guidelines suggest taking other preventive
measures such as: instructing all supervisors and managers to respond to complaints of harassment;
correcting apparent harassment even if no complaints are filed; ensuring that supervisors and managers
understand their responsibilities under the company policy; monitoring supervisor and manager conduct;
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In Kolstad, the Supreme Court provides proactive employers with another
defense to liability - a "good-faith-compliance" defense to punitive liability. 3
As long as employers undertake good-faith efforts to comply with federal
employment discrimination laws, courts cannot assess punitive damages against
them. "' Although the EEOC recommends that its anti-harassment guidelines
apply to all types of harassment and discrimination, 5 the guidelines do not
specifically outline what constitutes a good-faith effort to comply with Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 (Title VII), as Kolstad requires.
This note examines the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad to determine the
merits and implications of its holdings. Ultimately, this note argues that although
the Court chose a standard for awarding punitive damages that conflicts with the
purpose of the Civil Rights Act, the Court remedied this conflict by establishing
the good-faith-compliance defense. Part I contrasts federal law with state law,
specifically Title VII with the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act. Part II sets
forth the facts, reasoning, and holdings of the Kolstad decision. In Part III, the
substance of this note embarks on an exploration of what constitutes a Kolstad
"good..faith" effort by employers to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws.
This exploration examines the policy implications of the egregious conduct
standard versus the intent-based standard for awarding punitive damages; traces
the emergence of the good-faith defense; applies the new EEOC guidelines to the
Kolstad good-faith defense; compares the Kolstad defense with the
FaragherlEllerthaffirmative defense; analyzes the Kolstad defense within the
context of Oklahoma law; and researches the lower courts' initial application of
the good-faith defense. This note concludes that effective application of Kolstad
may possibly result in complete realization
of Title VI's goal of deterring
17
workplace discrimination and harassment.

screening supervisor applicants for reputations of engaging in harassing conduct; and keeping accurate

records of complaints. Id. § V(C)(2).
13. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544; see also Remedies: Kolstad's "Good Faith" Defense Means What It
Says, FED. LMGATOR, Feb. 2000, at 47,47 [hereinafter Koldstad's "Good Faith"Defense] (summarizing
Kolstad defense: "the usual vicarious liability rule is subject to an exception that allows an employer to
avoid liability for punitive damages by showing that it attempted in good faith not to discriminate.").
14. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
15. EEOC Notice, supra note 11, § 11("The rule in Ellerth and Faragherregarding vicarious
liability applies to harassment by supervisors based on race, color, sex (whether or not of a sexual
nature), religion, national origin, protected activity, age, or disability."); see also id § V(C)(I)(a) ("An
employer's [anti-harassment] policy should make clear that it will not tolerate harassment based on sex
(with or without sexual conduct), race, color, religion, national origin, age, disability, and protected
activity.").
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
17. But see Leading Cases, Civil Rights Act of 1991 - Employer Liability for Punitive Damages
in Title VII Claims, 113 HARv. L. REV. 359, 359-60 (1999) (reaching contrary conclusion that Kolstad
"rendered Title VI's most powerful deterrent mechanism - punitive damages - ineffectual").
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L History & Law Priorto Kolstad
A. Federal Law
Title VII prohibits discrimination in any aspect of employment on the basis of an
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."s Originally, Title VII did
not provide for an award of punitive damages. Instead, the remedies for Title VII
actions were purely equitable, including such relief as back pay and reinstatement. 9
Finding that "additional remedies under federal law are needed to deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace,"" Congress, in 1991,
amended Title VII to provide punitive damages for victims of intentional
discrimination based on sex, race, national origin, religion, or disability." Section
1981a of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 specifically provides for punitive damages
in cases in which the employer discriminated with "malice" or with "reckless
indifference" to the complaining party's civil rights.' Congress considered
monetary liability essential to realizing the deterrent purpose of Title VII, reasoning
that if discrimination is expensive, employers will cease their discriminatory
practices.'

18. Specifically, the Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). But cf. id.
§ 2000e-2(e)(l) (permitting intentional discrimination for religion,
sex, national origin, or age if these characteristics are a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that business or enterprise); id.§ 2000e-2(e)(2) (permitting
intentional discrimination on the basis of religion where an educational institution is directed by a
religious entity or its curriculum is directed toward propagation of the religion).
19. Judith J.Johnson, A Uniform Standardfor Exemplary Damages in Employment Discrimination

Cases, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 41, 50 (1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988)).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994) (congressional findings); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1,
at 69 (1991) ("Back pay as the exclusive monetary remedy under Title VII has not served as an effective
deterrent, and, when back pay is not available, as is the case where a discrimination victim remains onthe-job or leaves the workplace for other reasons other than discrimination, there is simply no
deterrent.").
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
22. Id § 1981a(b)(1). This statute provides in pertinent part:
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a
respondent (other than a government, government agency, or political subdivision) if the
complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice
or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
23. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 69 (1991).
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Although in line with the purpose of the Civil Rights Act, section 198 1a did not
provide courts with a clear standard for awarding punitive damages. 4 Shortly after
its implementation, commentators speculated that the new "reckless indifference"
language of the statute would "implicate virtually every case involving allegations
of intentional discrimination," resulting in a punitive damages award in "the vast
majority of cases."' Instead, section 1981a resulted in a federal circuit court split
over the appropriate standard for awarding punitive damages under Title VII. Most
circuit courts required employees to demonstrate that the employer engaged in some
form of egregious behavior.' Other circuit courts, including the Tenth Circuit,
focused on the employer's state of mind or intent in determining the existence of
malice or reckless indifference.' This lack of uniformity in awarding punitive
damages under Title VII and section 1981a led the U.S. Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in Kolstad.
B. Oklahoma Law
The Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act aims to provide state implementation of
the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.' The statutory
language of the Oklahoma act bears substantial similarity to that of the federal
act.29 Despite minor differences in wording, the statutes have the same substantive

24. Lewis, supra note 3 (discussing initial confusion with punitive damages standard).
25. Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: What Does It Mean and What Is Its Likely
Impact?, 71 NEB. L. Rav. 304, 311 (1992).
26. Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1998); Harris v. L & L Wings,
Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982-83 (4th Cir. 1997); McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Rest., 83 F.3d 498, 508 (lst Cir.
1996); Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir. 1996); Karcher v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 1996); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211,
1216 (6th Cir. 1996).
27. Baty v. Willamette Indus. Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1247-48 n.8 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring intent
standard); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 594 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming
jury instruction on intent-based standard); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 216-17 (2d Cir. 1997)
(requiring mere showing of employer's intent to violate Title VII).
28. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1101 (1991) (stating general purpose of act is "to provide for execution within
the state of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act").
29. The Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act provides in pertinent part:
A. It is a discriminatory practice for an employer.
1. To fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against an
individual with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, privileges or responsibilities of employment, because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or
handicap unless such action is related to a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the employer's business or enterprise.
25 OKLA. STAT. § 1302 (1991).
Comparatively, the federal Civil Rights Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:181

meaning and protect the same rights. For example, the Oklahoma act uses slightly
more expansive language than the federal act. It specifically includes age and
handicap in the list of protected classes and it provides that an action is not
discriminatory if it relates to "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the employer's business or enterprise."' The
federal act does not include such language. Moreover, the acts attach different
labels to employment violations. For example, the federal act terms such violations
as "unlawful employment practices,"'" whereas the Oklahoma act refers to
violations as "discriminatory practice[s]." 2 These minor differences in wording,
though, are inconsequential to the rights that the acts protect.
A significant disparity between the two acts does appear in the type of remedies
they provide. The federal act provides three types of remedies - equitable relief,
compensatory relief, and punitive damages.3 In contrast, the Oklahoma act
provides significantly less relief. It provides purely administrative relief, including,
at most, reinstatement, back-pay, and attorney fees.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently found these administrative remedies
inadequate for employees who experience discriminatory practices in the
workplace." Consequently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court developed the "Burk
public policy tort"' to provide compensatory and punitive damages in cases in
which "an employer violates public policy goals which are clearly articulated in
existing law - constitutional, statutory, or jurisprudential - and then only if there
is no adequate, statutorily-expressed remedy for the same."3 Because no adequate
statutory remedy exists in Oklahoma for employment discrimination, Oklahoma
courts have applied the Burk public policy tort to afford aggrieved employees a
monetary remedy in limited situations under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination
Act.1
The Burk public policy tort does not articulate a standard for awarding punitive
damages. Instead, it leaves such awards up to statutory and common law
principles. In general, the Oklahoma standard for punitive damages requires only
30. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1302.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
32. 25 OKLA.STAT. § 1302(A).
33. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
34. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1505 (1991); see also Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1228
(Okla. 1992) (outlining limited remedies under Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act).
35. Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group, 981 P.2d 321, 325 (Okla. 1999) (finding that the Oklahoma act
specifically excludes federal remedies provided in Title VII).
36. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
37. Collier, 981 P.2d at 323 (citing Burk, 770 P.2d at 29).
38. Collier, 981 P.2d at 326 (extending Burk to cases of wrongful discharge caused by quid pro quo
sexual harassment); Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1230 (Okla. 1992) (extending Burk
to cases of racially motivated discharge or of retaliation for filing racial discrimination complaint). But
see Marshall v. OK Rental & Leasing, Inc., 939 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Okla. 1997) (determining Burk does
not extend to cases of constructive discharge due to sexual harassment by co-worker); List v. Anchor
Paint Mfg. Co., 910 P.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Okla. 1996) (refusing to extend Burk to claims of wrongful
discharge for age discrimination because of adequate statutory remedies).
39. Burk, 770 P.2d at 28 n.10 ("recoverable damages including punitive damages in such actions
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that the jury find that the defendant acted with "reckless disregard for the rights of
others"'' or "acted intentionally and with malice towards others."'" In Part Eli, this
Note explores Koldstad's application to Oklahoma law and the Burk public policy
42

tort.

1.Statement of the Case: Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n
Carole Kolstad (Kolstad) sued the American Dental Association (ADA)43 under
Title VII for sexual discrimination based on the ADA's choice to promote a male
colleague over Kolstad." Kolstad claimed that the ADA used a "sham" process in
selecting which employee to promote.45 As evidence of this sham, Kolstad showed
(1) that the ADA modified the particular job description to better suit the male
employee, and (2) that the employee in charge of the promotion told sexually
offensive jokes, made derogatory comments about professional women, and refused
to meet with Kolstad concerning her interest in the position." Thus, Kolstad
claimed that
the ADA failed to promote her because of her gender in violation of
47
Title VII.
At trial, the jury found that the ADA discriminated against Kolstad on the basis
of sex and awarded her $52,728 in back pay." However, the district court refused
Kolstad's request for a jury instruction on punitive damages,"' and Kolstad
appealed.'
A. Court of Appeals Analysis
The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
district court should have instructed the jury that an award of punitive damages is
appropriate upon a finding of malice or reckless indifference to Kolstad's rights."
The court rejected the ADA's contention that an award of punitive damages requires
a finding of "extraordinary egregious" conduct.' The court reasoned that had
Congress intended to depart from the well-established intent-based standard for

are governed by our statutory and common law principles of tort liability").
40. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1(3) (2000)
41. Id. § 9.1(C)(1), (D)(1) (emphasis added).
42. See infra Part 1II.B.2.
43. The suit was brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Kolstad
v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 912 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1996).
44. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 530 (1999).
45. It.at 526.
46. letat 531.
47. Id. at 530.
48. Id.at 532.
49. Id.
50. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1997), overruled by Kolstad v.
Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
51. Md. at 1438.
52. Id.at 1437.
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awarding punitive damages under other federal civil rights statutes, it would have
expressly provided so in the language of Title V11"
Subsequently, the court of appeals granted a motion to rehear en bane the issue
of punitive damages.' The en bane majority held that an award of punitive
damages requires a showing of egregious conduct." The majority recognized a
two-tier structure of section 1981a.' The first tier provides for an award of
compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII cases upon a showing of intentional
discrimination;' the second tier requires, for an award of punitive damages, the
additional showing of malice or reckless indifference to federally protected rights."
The majority reasoned that this two-tier structure reveals Congress' intent to set the
standard for punitive damages higher than the ordinary standard for intentional
discrimination under Title VII. 59 The en bane majority determined that punitive
damages would be appropriate in cases in which "the evidence shows that the
defendant engages in a pervasive pattern of discriminatory acts, or manifested
genuine spite and malevolence, or otherwise evinced a criminal indifference to civil
obligations."' Because the majority found no evidence that the ADA engaged in
such egregious conduct," it affirmed the district court in withholding a jury
instruction on punitive damages."
B. U.S. Supreme Court Analysis
1. The Court Announces the Appropriate Standard for Assessing Punitive
Damages
Recognizing a circuit court split on the issue, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine the circumstances under which courts may award punitive
damages in cases arising under Title VII.' The Court held by a 7-2 vote that an
employer's conduct need not be egregious to justify awarding punitive damages'
as long as the employer acts with the knowledge that his or her discriminatory
conduct may violate federal law.' The Court considered this holding consistent
with the two-tier standard of liability imposed by section 1981a: the first tier limits
compensatory and punitive damages to cases of intentional discrimination or

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
to show
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 1446; see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 961.
IR.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1994).
Id § 1981a(b)(1).
Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 961-62.
Id. at 965 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 969 (finding evidence of pre-selection by itself, as was offered in this case, is insufficient
egregious conduct).
Id. at 970.
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 529 (1999).
Id. at 546.
Id at 536-37.
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disparate treatment,' the second tier requires the additional showing of intent to
deprive employees of their federally protected rights, not the additional showing of
egregious conduct as the en banc circuit court had found. 7
The Court reached its intent-based punitive damages standard by examining the
meaning of "malice" and "reckless" as they appear in section 1981a. The legislative
history of the statute shows that Congress adopted the language of section 1981a
from the Supreme Court opinion of Smith v. Wade,' which established an intentbased standard for awarding punitive damages in cases arising under section
1983,69 a civil rights statute similar in purpose to Title VII and section 1981a.
Accordingly, the Court found section 1981a likewise incorporates an intent-based
standard70 that ultimately focuses on the employer's state of mind, rather than the
employer's actions. 7'
2. The Court Creates a Good-Faith-ComplianceDefense to Punitive Liability
Further, the Kolstad Court held in a narrow 5-4 vote that an employer will not
be held vicariously liable for discriminatory decisions made by managerial
employees when such decisions run counter to the employer's good-faith efforts to
comply with Title VII.' The Court reached this decision by relying on general
principles of agency law, which require the plaintiff to impute liability to the
employer for the discriminatory actions of its managerial staff.' Assessing
vicarious liability for punitive damages against the employer in the face of its goodfaith effort to comply with Title VII conflicts with the underlying principle of
agency law74 that one should not be held vicariously liable when she is personally
innocent." Recognizing this conflict, the Court allowed employers to escape
vicarious punitive liability upon a showing of good-faith compliance with Title

66. Id. at 534-35 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l)).
67. Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2)).
68. 461 U.S. 30, 30 (1983) ("[A] jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages ... when the
defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or
callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others").
69. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 534.
72. Id. at 544.
73. Id. at 542-43 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957)).
This Restatement section provides in pertinent part:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because
of an act by an agent if, but only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of
employment, or
(d) the principal or managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C.
74. Id. at 543-44.
75. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 909 cmt. b (1991)).
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VII. 76 In so doing, the Court noted the importance of encouraging employers to
implement anti-discrimination policies that detect and deter Title VII violations."
3. Essence of Kolstad Holding
The Tenth Circuit recently applied Kolstad in EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc."'
This unpublished opinion reduced Kolstad's holding to the following requirements:
[To demonstrate its entitlement to punitive damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the employer acted with malice
or reckless indifference, a state of mind which can be shown with
evidence that the employer discriminated against the employee with the
knowledge that it might be violating federal law; (2) an employee
serving in a managerial capacity committed the wrong; (3) the
managerial agent was acting in the scope of employment; (4) the agent's
action was not contrary to the employer's good-faith efforts to comply
with Title VII."
III. Analysis
A. Policy Implications of the Two Standards
In analyzing whether the Court reached the appropriate decision in Kolstad, one
must consider the public policy implications underlying the two competing standards - egregious conduct versus intent to violate federal law. Specifically, this note
focuses on the policy concerns of balancing the rights, duties, and responsibilities of
employers and employees in relation to discrimination and harassment within the
workplace.
1.Egregious Conduct Standard
Supporters of the egregious conduct standard view the second tier of section
1981a as requiring the heightened showing that the employer acted in an unnecessarily egregious manner.' Employers, the defendants to Title VII claims, normally
favor this standard because, theoretically, employees have more difficulty meeting
and proving the egregious conduct standard. Employees face a more difficult task
under the egregious conduct standard because the standard lends itself to proof by
direct evidence, rather than circumstantial evidence.5 ' Direct evidence tends to have
more probative value than circumstantial evidence because it does not require the

76. Ild.
at 544-46.

77. Id.
78. No. 97-2252, 1999 WL 1032963, at *3 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999).
79. Ld.
(citations omitted); see also Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1306
(M.D. Ala. 2000) (setting forth same four requirements from Kolstad holding).
80. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 961.
81. Id. at 969 n.9; see BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 460 (6th ed. 1990) (defining direct evidence as
"evidence that directly proves a fact, without an inference or presumption, and which in itself, if true,

conclusively establishes that fact").
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss1/14
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jury to draw inferences regarding the facts in question. In the context of punitive
damages under Title VII, requiring proof by direct evidence has the limiting effect
of ensuring that employers truly deserve punishment in the form of punitive
liability. In contrast, the circumstantial and indirect nature of evidence used to
demonstrate an employer's state of mind under the intent standard requires more
speculation by the trier of fact?' Relying on circumstantial evidence under the
intent standard, then, may result in juries assessing punitive damages in a wider
array of employment discrimination cases,' including cases in which the employer
does not actually deserve the penalty.
Another policy implication of the egregious conduct standard is that it serves the
underlying purpose of Title VII more effectively than the intent standard. Title VII
has an articulated, prophylactic purpose - to provide employers an incentive to
prevent intentional discrimination in the workplace." The egregious conduct
standard provides such incentive because, unlike the intent-based standard, it does
not punish employers for having knowledge of the law." Instead, the egregious
conduct standard encourages knowledge of and compliance with Title VII. The
egregious conduct standard punishes only outrageous forms of discrimination by the
employer, such as total disregard for Title VII responsibilities. The egregious
conduct standard, then, ensures the punishment of those employers who choose to
ignore their Title VII obligations. In limiting punishment to instances of such
outrageous discrimination, the egregious conduct standard encourages employers to
take anti-discrimination laws seriously.
2. Intent-Based Standard
Proponents of the intent-based standard advocate the position that the second tier
of section 1981a requires merely the intent to deprive the employee of his or her
federally protected rights. Courts, though, often interpret this intent standard as
requiring no more than the intent inherent in the underlying cause of action merely the intent to discriminate." This interpretation misconstrues the standard
by making the intent to discriminate synonymous with the intent to deprive
employee -rights.' This misconstruction results in courts awarding punitive

82. See generally lacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating intent standard
requires employee-plaintiff to adduce evidence sufficient to show that employer discriminated with
knowledge of violating plaintiffs rights or with conscious disregard of possibility of violating his rights).
83. See discussion infra Part III.B.I.
84. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1). at 65 (1991).
85. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
86. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 960 (stating the issue before the court as being
"whether the standard of evidence for punitive damages under Title VII is, in all but a narrow range of
cases, no higher than the standard for liability"). But see Johnson, supra note 19, at 98 (finding less
culpable state of mind required for punitive damages than required to find intent to discriminate).
87. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999) (identifying circumstances where
intentional discrimination does not warrant punitive damages, including instances where the employer
is unaware of the relevant federal prohibition; where the employer believes certain discrimination is
lawful; where the underlying theory of discrimination is novel or poorly recognized; or where the
employer believes the discrimination falls within a statutory exception to liability); Olsen v. Marriott Int'l,
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damages in situations where there is no evidence that the employer intended to
deprive an employee of his or her rights but only where evidence is sufficient to
prove the claim of discrimination.
The intent-based standard theoretically makes punitive damages more widely
available than does the egregious conduct standard." The consequence of awarding
punitive damages in the mass of intentional discrimination cases advances the goal
of the Civil Rights Act to deter discriminatory practices." By including punitive
damages under the Act, Congress evidenced its commitment to halt job
discrimination.' Harsh penalties such as punitive damages make employers think
twice about violating the law.91 Therefore, proponents argue, the more widespread
the availability of punitive damages, the more deterrent their effect.
This policy argument, however, has inherent flaws. The standard itself, not the
effect of the standard, should advance the purpose of the Civil Rights Act, yet that
is not the case under the intent standard. Rather, the intent standard discriminating in the face of a perceived risk of violating the law' - encourages
employers to hide from the law rather than to embrace and apply the law. For
example, employers gamer the requisite "perceived risk [to] violate federal law"
through their familiarity with the law.93 It follows, then, that a standard under
which knowledge of the law exposes employers to punitive liability likewise
encourages employers to remain ignorant of the law.
Notably, the Kolstad Court explicitly alluded to such employer ignorance as a
defense to punitive liability. For example, in listing circumstances under which an
employer may engage in discrimination but would not be liable for punitive
damages under the intent standard, the Kolstad Court stated, "an employer may
simply be unaware of the relevant federal prohibition."' This standard does not
further the preventive purpose of the Civil Rights Act. It has the pervasive effect
of encouraging employers not to take a proactive approach to preventing
discrimination because a proactive approach itself infers knowledge of the law.9"

Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1075 (D. Ariz. 1999) ("[The terms 'malice' and 'reckless indifference' refer
not to an employer's knowledge that it is engaging in discriminatory conduct, but to an 'employer's
knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law.") (citing Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536).
88. See infra discussion § III.B.
89. Amicus Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *6, Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (No. 98-

208).
90. lMJ
91. Id.
92. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536 ("[fln the context of Section 1981a, an employer must at least
discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive
damages.").
93. Id.
94. Id. at 536-37.
95. See, e.g., Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 1999)
("[E]xistence of the employment handbook setting forth a policy of non-discrimination is at least prima
facie evidence of awareness [of the law].").
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The policies underlying the intent-based punitive damages standard are illogical
and inconsistent with the purpose of the Civil Rights Act. The mere fact that the
intent standard may result in holding more employers liable for punitive damages
does not itself motivate employers to take a proactive approach to discrimination.
In fact, considering that any preventive steps the employer takes against
discrimination can serve as an aggrieved employee's proof that the employer
discriminated in the face of a perceived risk of violating the law, the intent standard
may motivate employers to take an inactive approach to discrimination. Granted,
the Supreme Court remedied this flaw in Kolstad by coupling the intent standard
with a new good-faith-compliance defense to punitive liability. However, as argued
infra,' this itself provides strong evidence that the Court chose the wrong standard.
B. Kolstad's Significance
1. Frequency of Use
Three months after the Supreme Court decided Kolstad, the Tenth Circuit had
already applied the new punitive damages standard twice, 7 and twenty-one courts
across the United States applied it within four months of its decision.98 This
demonstrates that Kolstad will most likely prove to be an important case setting
forth a frequently invoked standard. Also, EEOC reports show that the total number
of employment discrimination claims filed in recent years hovers around 80,000
claims a year, with approximately 20,000 Title VII claims each year." Each of
these claimants could potentially seek punitive damages, resulting in a large number
of cases invoking the Kolstad intent standard every year. The potential frequency
of its use makes Kolstad a significant decision of which employment and labor law
attorneys should take note and advise their clients.

96. See discussion infra Part III.C.
97. Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).
98. See Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); lacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d
14, 26 (lst Cir. 1999); Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 252 (4th Cir. 1999); Smith v.
Pepersack, Nos. 98-1842, 98-1843, 1999 WL 760218, at *5 (4th Cir., Sept. 24, 1999) (unpublished
opinion); Gotthardt v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999); Knowlton, 189
F.3d at 1187; Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 286; Wal-MartStores, Inc, 187 F.3d at 1249; Williams
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 182 F.3d 333, 333 (5th Cir. 1999); Dhyne v. Meiners Thriftway, Inc., 184 F.3d
983, 988 (8th Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 60 (1st Cir. 1999); Kimbrough
v. Loma Linda Dev., Inc., 183 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1999); Blackmon v. Pinkerton Sec. &
Investigative Servs., 182 F.3d 629, 635 (8th Cir. 1999); Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 2d
228, 263 (S.D.N.Y.1999); Hipp v. Liberty Natl. Life Ins. Co., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1343 (M.D. Fla.
1999); EEOC v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 63 F. Supp. 2d 684, 693 (D. Md. 1999); Scully v. Borough
of Hawthorne, 58 F. Supp. 2d 435, 457 (D.N.J. 1999); White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 P.2d 944, 947 n.2
(Cal. 1999), Cavuoti v. N.J. Transit Corp., 735 A.2d 548, 556 (N.J. 1999), Haynes v. Rhone-Poulene,
Inc., 521 S.E.2d 331, 352 (W. Va. 1999).
99. EEOC Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 2000, available at http:llwww.eeoc.gov/stats/
charges.html (last modified Jan. 18, 2001) (reporting total charges for FY 2000 at 79,876, for FY 1999
at 77,444, for FY 1998 at 79,591, for FY 1997 at 80,680, for FY 1996 at 77,990; and Title VII charges
for 1998 at 17,246, for 1997 at 16,394, for 1996 at 14,412).
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Its significance further increases if the Kolstad standard results in the awarding
of punitive damages in the vast majority of employment discrimination cases."m
This effect is not immediately apparent and will only demonstrate itself over time.
However, a perusal of the cases that have applied the Kolstad standard thus far
yields a preliminary demonstration that the intent standard seems to impose a
relatively light burden for plaintiffs.'' For example, two cases have applied
Kolstad to reverse the lower courts' refusal to award punitive damages,"c while
only one court has applied Kolstad to reverse an award of punitive damages. 3
Courts have also found that a minimum showing of intent satisfies the Kolstad
standard, such as ignoring employee complaints'" or making gender-specific or

100. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1441 (Williams, J., dissenting) (suggesting the result of an intent-based
standard "is that punitive damages are available in every case of garden-variety Title VII discrimination");
Powell v. Cobe Labs., Inc., Nos. 98-1350, 98-1363, 2000 WL 235241, at *10 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 2000)
(unpublished opinion) ("Given the Court's pronouncements in Kolstad, many intentional discrimination
cases may meet the 'malice or reckless indifference' requirement of § 198 Ia."); Joseph P. Monteleone,
Punitive Damagesfor Employment Discrimination,RISK MGMT., Sept. 1, 1999, at 86, available at 1999
WL 9191776 (hypothesizing that Kolstad makes it easier for plaintiffs to obtain punitive damages).
101. Knowlton, 189 F.3d at 1187 (applying Kolstad to reverse district court's refusal to award
punitive damages, finding management's awareness of sexual innuendo within the workplace and lack
of response to complaints sufficient evidence of reckless disregard for employee's federally protected
rights); Kimbrough, 183 F.3d at 785 (applying Kolstad, found that evidence that an employer or its
management repeatedly ignored complaints about harassment or ratified harassing conduct is sufficient
to award punitive damages); Blackmon, 182 F.3d at 636 (finding under Kolstadthe following is sufficient
proof for punitive damages: employer failed to investigate employee complaints, failed to institute
prompt remedial action and took retaliatory action against employee making complaints); Smith, 1999
WL 760218, at *5 (unpublished opinion) (interpreting Kolstad standard as allowing mere existence of
civil rights violation to guarantee punitive liability with only limited exceptions); Orkin, 63 F. Supp. 2d
at 693 (applying Kolstad to reverse lower court's dismissal of claim for punitive damages, finding
employer's comments about employee's foreign accent sufficient evidence of reckless disregard of
employee's rights). But cf lacobucci, 193 F.3d at 26 (applying Kolstad to reverse award of punitive
damages, finding that the state of mind necessary to make out a cognizable claim "differs importantly
from that required to justify punitive damages"); Dhyne, 184 F.3d at 988 (applying Kolstad to find that
delayed action on sexual harassment complaints showed "no evidence suggesting evil motive or
intentional violation of federal law").
102. Knowlton, 189 F.3d at 1187-88 (applying Kolstad to reverse lower court's pre-Kostad finding
of insufficient evidence for punitive damages award); Orkin, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (applying Kolstad
to reverse lower court's pre-Kolstad dismissal of punitive damages claim).
103. lacobucci, 193 F.3d at 26 (applying Kolstad to reverse lower court's pre-Kolstad award of
punitive damages premised merely on intentional discrimination standard); see also Scott v. Ameritex
Yam, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596-98 (D.S.C. Nov. 19, 1999) (applying Kolstad to reverse lower court's
refusal to grant employer's request for summary judgment on punitive damages).
104. Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 2000) (basing
punitive damages award not only on management's not responding to complaints but also on management
minimizing and disregarding complaints); Knowlton, 189 F.3d at 1187 (basing punitive damages award
on employer's lack of response to complaints of sexual harassment); Kimbrough, 183 F.3d at 785 (basing
punitive damages award on management ignoring complaints of harassment); Blackmon, 182 F.3d at 636
(basing punitive damages award on employer's failure to investigate complaints). But see Dhyne, 184
F.3d at 988 (finding delayed action on harassment complaints no grounds for punitive damages); Lintz
v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1207-08 (D. Kan. 1999) (applying Kolstad to refuse
punitive damages award based on evidence of adequate response and immediate investigation of
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nationality-specific comments about employees."° Such applications indicate a low
threshold for meeting the Kolstad intent standard.
Coupling this easy-to-meet standard, though, with the Kolstad good-faithcompliance defense should save many employers from punitive liability."
Although most employees bringing discrimination claims can potentially
demonstrate the requisite employer intent to deprive federally protected rights, many
employers should be able to counter such claims with evidence of their good-faith
efforts to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws.
Whether this good-faith-compliance defense will prove to be an easy or difficult
standard for employers to invoke cannot yet be determined. The courts applying the
defense thus far have not allowed employers an easy escape from punitive
liability."tm The courts have found that merely having an anti-discrimination policy
in place does not establish the defense without supplemental evidence that the
employer actually follows its policy."° The most significant, perhaps, of the strict
applications of the good-faith defense appears in the Tenth Circuit opinion of Deters
v. Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc."' The Deters court refused to apply
the good-faith defense, distinguishing the vicarious liability standard of Kolstad
from the "direct liability" of the case before the court."' This indicates that courts

harassment complaints).
105. Orkin, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (finding employer's statements about employee's foreign accent
grounds for punitive damages award).
106. Julie Brienza, Supreme Court Makes Punitive Damagesfor Job Bias Harder to Get, TRIAL,
Sept. 1, 1999, at 16 (determining Kolstad's good-faith-compliance defense makes courts less likely to
award punitive damages); Punitive Damages - Employment Discrimination- "Good Faith Effort"
Defense, 14 No. 12 FED. LITIGATOR 308, 309 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter "Good Faith Effort" Defense]
(predicting "'good faith effort' defense is likely to make punitive damages more difficult to obtain.").
107. Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding
evidence of a grievance filing procedure does not establish good-faith compliance when counter evidence
shows that management did not effectively respond to grievances); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187
F.3d 1241, 1249 (l0th Cir. 1999) ("[A] generalized policy of equality and respect for the individual does
not demonstrate an implemented good-faith policy of educating employees on the Act's accommodation
and nondiscrimination requirements"); Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 2d 228,263 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (finding employer seeking legal counsel on employment issues does not establish good-faith
compliance where evidence suggests that employer ignored legal advice). But see Dhyne, 184 F.3d at
988 (finding employer made good-faith efforts to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws despite
excessive delay in taking action on complaints of harassment); Lintz, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1207-08 (finding
sufficient evidence of good-faith compliance in immediate response to harassment complaints); Scott v.
Ameritex Yam, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587, 598 (D.S.C. 1999) (refusing to adopt negative inference from
Kolstad defense that lack of good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII automatically warrants award
of punitive damages).
108. Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 286 (finding management must follow implemented
grievance policy in order to meet good-faith defense); Wal-MartStoresInc., 187 F.3d at 1248-49 (finding
that to meet the defense, a policy must be relatively specific, and must be implemented and followed
within the workplace); Greenbaum, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 263-64 (finding that where employer seeks legal
advice, the employer must at least follow such advice in order to have a good-faith defense).
109. 202 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000).
110. Id. In distinguishing Kolstad, the Tenth Circuit specifically stated:
Kolstad was a case involving vicarious liability, unlike this case which is premised on a
theory of direct liability. Thus, the good-faith defense does not apply. It is negated by a
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may initially adopt a strict application of the good-faith-compliance defense.
Coupling this strict application of the Kolstad defense with the lax application of
the Kolstad intent standard may mean that most employers sued under Title VII will
face paying thousands of dollars in punitive damages. 1 ' This again signifies to
employment and labor law attorneys the importance of ensuring that their clients
make legitimate efforts to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws.
2. Kolstad's Signiflcance Under Oklahoma Law
The importance of developing and following workplace anti-discrimination
policies under Kolstad applies in Oklahoma as well, even though the Oklahoma
Anti-Discrimination Act does not provide a punitive remedy for employment
discrimination."' Perhaps the absence of judicial remedy under state law makes
the remedies available under the federal Civil Rights Act even more important in
Oklahoma."' Because Oklahoma employees who fall victim to workplace
discrimination do not have a monetary judicial remedy under Oklahoma law, they
may be more likely to file federal claims under Title VII. This correlates to frequent
application of the Kolstad intent-based standard and good-faith-compliance defense
in federal cases brought by plaintiffs within Oklahoma.

showing of direct malice or reckless indifference to (the] federally protected rights of [the
plaintiff] by [the managerial employee] who was designated by the company as a final
decision-making authority responsible for implementing the company anti-discrimination
policy ....
Id. at 1271; see also Dodoo v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 235 F.3d 522, 531-32 (10th Cir. 2000) (following
Deters, holding "Kolstad involved vicarious liability, so that its agency principles do not bear on the
situation here, where punitive damages are imposed on the basis of direct liability.").
In Deters, the Tenth Circuit began its analysis on this issue with the doctrine of respondeat superior,
which provides that "employer malice or reckless indifference in failing to remedy or prevent a hostile
or offensive work environment of which management-level employees knew or should have known is
premised on direct liability, not derivative liability." Deters, 202 F.3d at 1270 (citing Adler v. Wal-Mart
Stores, 144 F.3d 664, 673 (10th Cir. 1998)). Important to the court's analysis seems to be that the
employee whom the plaintiff accuses of harassing conduct was given responsibility for enforcing
defendant's policy against discrimination and harassment, such that the employee's knowledge of the
conduct equates to the company's constructive knowledge of such conduct. Id. at 1270-71. The court
also deemed significant the company's insufficient response to the plaintiffs complaints of harassment.
Id. at 1271 (defining the lack of response as "reckless and malicious"). As of yet, other circuits have not
followed the Tenth Circuit's distinction between direct and vicarious liability in applying the good-faithcompliance defense.
Ill. The Civil Rights Act caps punitive damages awards between $50,000 and $300,000, depending
on the size of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994).
112. See supra discussion Part I.B.
113. Richard T. Seymour, Proceedingsof the 1999 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law
Schools Section on Employment DiscriminationLaw: Is There a Disconnect Between EEO Law and the
Workplace?, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y 1. 131, 149 (1999) (implying remedies available
under federal law are of great importance in states where state law provisions for workplace
discrimination do not entitle complaining parties to go to court); see also Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group,
981 P.2d 321,329 (Okla. 1999) (Kauger, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Burk application because "[t]he
remedies afforded under the Federal [Civil Rights] Act are available in [Oklahoma] courts").
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Just as the Kolstad defense applies in federal courts within Oklahoma, it may also
apply to employment discrimination claims brought in state court under the Burk
public policy tort."" At first glance, Kolstad does not appear applicable to Burk
claims because the Burk tort is based on a violation of public policy, not on a
violation of an employee's federally protected rights. However, Burk defines "public
policy" as including policy goals clearly articulated in constitutional, statutory, or
regulatory law as well as in judicial decisions. 15 Because Oklahoma adopted its
act in order to implement the policies of the federal Civil Rights Act,1 6 the Burk
tort arguably subsumes the policy mandates of the Civil Rights Act as articulated
in Kolstad so that the Kolstad good-faith defense applies under certain Burk claims.
For example, Oklahoma courts have applied the Burk tort to afford remedy to
employees whose protected rights (under both the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination
Act and Title VII) were violated." 7 Further, as a remedy to Burk torts, Oklahoma
courts may award punitive damages."" It follows, then, that in Burk public policy
tort cases arising under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, Oklahoma courts
could afford employers the opportunity to invoke the Kolstad good-faith defense in
order to escape punitive liability. The Kolstad Court created the defense in order
to promote the deterrent policy underlying the federal Civil Rights Act. The
Oklahoma act, then, incorporates this same deterrent policy."' In order to
encourage Oklahoma employers to prevent workplace discrimination and
harassment, Oklahoma courts should allow employers to raise a similar type of
Kolstad defense to Burk public policy torts arising under the Oklahoma AntiDiscrimination Act.
Because the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently opened Oklahoma courtrooms to
hearing discrimination claims under the Burk tort even when adequate federal
remedies are available,"2 the Kolstad defense may become even more crucial for
114. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
115. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24,29 (Okla. 1989) (quoting Pamer v. Americana Hotels, Inc.,
652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (establishing the public policy tort in Hawaii)).
116. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1101 (1991) (stating general purpose of act is "to provide for execution
within the state of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964").
117. Collier, 981 P.2d at 324-25 (reasoning that because the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act
includes sexual harassment within protected parameters, it clearly articulates the protection of such under
public policy). This rationale could be applied to all protections under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination
Act. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1230 (Okla. 1992) (extending Burk tort to cases of
racially motivated discharge or of retaliation for filing racial discrimination complaint). But see Marshall
v. OK Rental & Leasing, Inc., 939 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Okla. 1997) (determining Burk tort does not extend
to cases of constructive discharge due to sexual harassment by co-worker); List v. Anchor Paint Mfg.
Co., 910 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Okla. 1996) (refusing to extend Burk tort to claims of wrongful discharge for
age discrimination because Oklahoma has adequate statutory remedies).
118. Burk v. K-Mart Corp, 770 P.2d 24, 28 n.10; see also Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will and
Public Policy,25 AKRON L. REV.497, 540 (1992) (availability of punitive damages in public policy torts
serves purpose of punishing and deterring); Brad Rogers Carson, Labor Law: Tate v. Browning-Ferris
Industries: Oklahoma Creates a Common Law Actionfor Employment Discrimination,46 OKLA. L. REv.
557, 575 (1993) ("The most significant benefit to a plaintiff of a common law action is the availability
of a greater range of damages.").
119. See supra note 115.
120. Collier, 981 P.2d at 326 (1999) (holding quid pro quo sexual harassment cases resulting in
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Oklahoma employers. For example, in Collier v. Insignia Financial Group"' the
court found that the language of the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act incorporates
the policies of Title VII but does not likewise incorporate its compensatory and
punitive remedies." Instead, the Oklahoma act provides only administrative
remedies." Collier, then, looked only to the statutory remedy available under
state law to find that an employee could bring a sexual harassment claim under the
Burk tort." By ignoring the available remedies under Title VII, Collier allows a
wronged Oklahoma employee to choose whether to seek remedy in federal court
under Title VII or in state court under the Burk public policy tort. If the Oklahoma
Supreme Court were to choose not to apply a Kolstad-type defense in state courts,
aggrieved employees would have greater incentive to pursue their claims in state
court rather than federal court because, in federal court, an employer's good-faith
effort to comply with Title VII would preclude the employee from collecting
punitive damages.
The Kolstad decision also impacts Oklahoma law by interpreting the statutory
language of section 1981a to create an intent-based standard for awarding punitive
damages. Although Oklahoma courts have not yet clarified whether the state's
punitive damages statute turns on egregious conduct or mere intent, Kolstad could
prove informative if an Oklahoma court undertakes such a decision. The language
of Oklahoma's punitive damages statute substantially resembles the pertinent
language of section 198 Ia. For example, Oklahoma's standard for punitive damages
requires "reckless disregard for the rights of others"" 5 or "act[ing] intentionally
and with malice towards others."'26 Similarly, section 1981a requires a showing
of intentional discrimination "with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."'" Both statutes require
either malice or reckless disregard for another's rights. Because of this similarity in
statutory language, Oklahoma could easily follow Kolstad to determine that
Oklahoma's punitive damages standard is also intent-based. In this regard,
Oklahoma courts could apply Kolstad to Burk tort claims to determine whether the
employer discriminated in the face of a perceived risk of violating the employee's
rights, thus warranting an award of punitive damages.

either explicit or constructive discharge actionable under Burk, despite federal remedies available under
Title VII).
121. 981 P.2d 321 (Okla. 1999).
122. Id.at 325.
(citing Duncan v. City of Nichols Hills, 913 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Okla. 1996)). Collier stated
123. lad
that the Oklahoma act will not incorporate additional remedies until the state legislature passes an act
to specifically provide so. Id.
124. Id. at 326.
125. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1(B) (Supp. 1995).
126. Id. § 9.1(D)(1).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
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C. Fair Compromise but Wrong Decision
In Kolstad, the Supreme Court struck a fair compromise in balancing employers'
liability with employees' rights. The Court's decision that mere employer awareness
of anti-discrimination laws provides sufficient proof of an intent to discriminate''
would be problematic if not coupled with the Court's subsequent holding that
employers can escape liability by making good-faith efforts to comply with Title
H
VII
' Without the good-faith-compliance escape chute, the intent-based standard
makes punitive damages potentially available in most employment discrimination
cases,' 3' leaving only a few narrow exceptions to punitive liability.' The intent
standard implies that evidence of an employer's instituting Title VII compliance
programs or seeking legal advice on its obligations under Title VII could be used
as support for assessing punitive damages against the employer. This implication
arises from the fact that the intent-based standard looks for evidence of the
employer's knowledge of violating an employee's federally protected rights. Thus,
implementing compliance programs and seeking legal advice suggest an employer's
knowledge of its Title VII obligations. The above implication contradicts the stated
purpose of the Civil Rights Act - to encourage employers to be proactive in
avoiding discrimination and harassment within the workplace.'
Kolstads good-faith defense remedies this problem with the intent-based standard
by rewarding, rather than punishing, employers for taking notice of the
discrimination laws and implementing preventive programs. This position aligns
with the preventive purpose of Title VII. Encouraging employees to adopt antidiscrimination policies and to educate their employees regarding Title VII advances
the underlying purpose of the Civil Rights Act. Such polices and education aim to
prevent discrimination before it becomes problematic within the workplace.
The Court's addition of the good-faith-compliance defense reveals that the Court
reached a decision contrary to the congressional intent underlying Title VII. Clearly,
the Court would not have added the good-faith defense unless it recognized that
choosing the intent-based standard defeated the prophylactic purpose of the Civil
Rights Act. Hence, the Court most likely added the good-faith defense in order to
bring the decision within the purpose of the Act.

128. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 536 (1999).
129. See id. at 545.
130. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
131. These exceptions include circumstances where the employer defends intentional discrimination
on grounds that it is not unlawful, such as:
erroneously using religion, sex or national origin as an employment qualification. Kolstad, 108
F.3d at 1438.
overreaching affirmative action plans. ld. at 1439.
discrimination that is merely negligent as to federally protected rights. Id.
discrimination that occurs outside scope of employer-employee relationship. Id.
discrimination that occurs in the face of an underlying theory of discrimination that is novel or
poorly recognized. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 537.
132. See H.R. REP. No. 40(1), at 65 (1991).
133. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998)).
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Eventually, the good-faith defense will prove to have substantially the same effect
as would have the egregious conduct standard - limiting the availability of punitive
damages awards to only the most egregious cases. This will occur as long as courts
effectively interpret the level of employer conduct necessary to reach a Kolstad
good-faith compliance. For example, if courts make the compliance bar too easy for
employers to meet so that employers can invoke the defense in almost any situation,
such interpretation would destroy employee protections under Title VII. Conversely,
if courts make the compliance standard too difficult to meet so that employers are
rarely able to invoke it, such interpretation would hinder the deterrent policy
underlying Title VII and discourage employers from undertaking good-faith efforts
to comply with Title VII. Courts should find that a Kolstad defense requires
substantial steps, but not necessarily extraordinary efforts, by the employer to thwart
discrimination within the workplace. If courts interpret the Kolstad defense in this
way, it will prove to be a fair balance of employee protections under Title VII and
will encourage employers to prevent workplace discrimination.
Once employment and labor law attorneys learn exactly what courts will consider
a good-faith effort to comply with Title VII, they can advise their clients on the
specific steps necessary to "insure" against punitive liability. If, after taking these
steps, the employer faces a discrimination charge, the employer will be able to slide
down the good-faith-compliance escape chute and avoid punitive liability by
demonstrating its efforts to comply with Title VII. Eventually, the only employers
held liable for punitive damages will be those who negligently fail to enforce antidiscrimination policies within their workplaces. Such failure to comply with the law
will itself become egregious conduct in a corporate atmosphere where discrimination
prevention is the norm.
D. Problems with Kolstad
1. Good-FaithDefense Was "Voluntary Commentary" by the Court
Kolstad may be a "fair" decision, but it also has some problems. Justice Stevens
raises one of these problems in the dissenting opinion, criticizing the majority for
"volunteering commentary" on the good-faith-compliance defense discussion."
He implies that the Court went out on a limb in deciding this issue because no party
briefed or argued the issue, no amicus curiae advocated the position, and the
decision "reject[s] the Government's view of its own statute without giving it an

134. Id. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The absence of briefing or meaningful argument by the
parties makes this Court's gratuitous decision to volunteer an opinion on this nonissue particularly ill
advised. It is not this Court's practice to consider arguments - specifically, alternative defense of the
judgment under review - that were not presented in the brief in opposition to the petition for

certiorari.").
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opportunity to be heard on the issue."'3 For these reasons, the Court entertained
a close majority (5-4) on its good-faith defense holding.
The majority discredits the dissent's criticism by asserting that the agency issue
is "intimately bound up with" and "subsumed within" the issue of determining the
appropriate circumstances under which to award punitive damages in Title VII
actions." Although the dissent raises an interesting criticism of the majority's
creation of a good-faith defense, the defect is not fatal. To the contrary, the Kolstad
result would destroy the intention of Title VII without the good-faith-compliance
defense. The intent-based punitive damages standard standing alone frustrates the
preventive purpose of the Civil Rights Act and renders the statute purely
remedial.'3' The standard encourages ignorance of the law rather than a full
embrace of the law in effectuating the prevention of workplace discrimination. The
good-faith-compliance defense remedies the defect of the Court's initial holding by
encouraging knowledge and implementation of the law.
Because the parties to the case did not put the Court on notice of the idea of a
good-faith defense, it is interesting to trace the evolution of this concept. The
dissenting judges in the court of appeal's rehearing en banc opinion initially raised
the concept of a good-faith defense."w The dissenting judges suggested that
because punitive damages are never awarded as of right, juries have the discretion
to determine that employers who take certain proactive steps to do "everything they
[can] to comply with the law should not be punished with punitive damages. '
The Supreme Court then took this concept and expanded it into the good-faithcompliance defense.
The en banc dissent also cited a Supreme Court case that created a similar goodfaith defense to liquidated damages in the context of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).'" The Court in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston 4'
found that meeting with lawyers to draft company policies consistent with the
ADEA and subsequently adopting a new policy and adhering to it demonstrated that

135. Id.Commentators have also criticized the Court for this sort of "procedural overreaching,"
which Professor Erwin Chemerinsky terms "the new judicial activism." William C. Rooklidge &
Appellate
Matthew F. Weil, Essay, JudicialHyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's Discomfort With Its

Role, 15 BERK.TECH. L.J. 725, 727 n.6 (2000). Chemerinsky has pointed to Kolstad as an example of
the Court "stepping out of its traditional appellate role to decide questions as to which certiorari had not
been granted, and which had neither been addressed by the lower courts in deciding the case, nor briefed
or argued by the parties." Id. (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, The New JudicialActivism, CAL LAW., Feb.

2000, at 25, 26).
136. Kolstad,527 U.S. at 540; see also Johnson, supra note 19, at 79-86 (considering the agency

issue of holding employers liable for punitive damages based on the acts of supervisors central to
determining the punitive damages standard).
137. See supra discussion § III.A.

138. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 973 (1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 129 (1985) (holding that employers who
intentionally violate the ADEA may nevertheless avoid liquidated damages by demonstrating that they
attempted "reasonably and in good faith" to comply with the law).

141. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
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the employer acted "reasonably and in good faith" to comply with federal law so
that liquidated damages were not justified.4 4 Although the Supreme Court did not
cite this case in creating the good-faith-compliance defense, it nevertheless
demonstrates that, contrary to Justice Stevens' dissent, this holding does not present
a novel concept invented by the Court in the process of volunteering commentary
4
on an issue not before the Court. 1
Further, the Tenth Circuit has suggested that case law out of two circuits and at
least one district court allowed for a good-faith compliance jury instruction prior to
Kolstad. For example, in Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp. " the Tenth Circuit
recognized that the District Court of Kansas had ruled in 1997 that "a plaintiff
asserting vicarious liability against her employer in a Title VII suit may receive
punitive damages if she presents evidence demonstrating the employer's failure to
make good-faith efforts to remedy known harassment."""5 The Cadena court also
stated that the Fifth Circuit foreshadowed Kolstad in 1996 with Patterson v. P.H.P
Healthcare Corp.," which suggested the impropriety of punitive liability when the
evidence fails to show that the employer "took any action which was inconsistent
with [its nondiscrimination] policy ...[nor] had knowledge of [the harasser's]
malicious or reckless conduct, or authorized, ratified, or approved [the harasser's]
actions."'47 The Cadena court also cited the Eleventh Circuit's 1996 decision of
Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc., which allowed an employer to escape punitive liability
upon a showing "that the employer 'had a general policy against sexual harassment
and did investigate the complaints it received." 49
Justice Stevens' criticism of the majority's creating the good-faith defense in
Kolstad does not render the decision unsound. Rather, as the majority asserts, this
issue is inherently bound up in determining the punitive damages standard. Further,
the lower court decisions discussed the applicability of a good-faith defense as have
other courts in recent years.

142. Id. at 129-30. This good-faith defense under the ADEA is not as broad as the defense provided
in Kolstad. For example, a district court determined that the Supreme Court recognizes only three acts
of "good faith" that may save the employer from liquidated damages. These three acts are: (1) that the
employer was ignorant of the correlation between the selection mechanism and age; (2) that the employer
believed that age was a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) that the employer believed the
employee was not covered by the ADEA. Dittman v. Ireco, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 347, 349 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
143. A case that the Supreme Court cited in arriving at its good-faith defense is Harrisv. L & L
Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997). Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544 (stating that Harrisobserved that
"[iln
some cases, the existence of a written policy instituted in good faith has operated as a total bar to
employer liability for punitive damages"). This case also illustrates that the Court did not present an
entirely novel concept in adopting a good-faith defense.
144. 224 F.3d 1203, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2000).
145. Id. at 1212 (summarizing Baty v. Willamette Ind., 985 F. Supp. 987, 996 (D. Kan. 1997))
(asserting that the Baty holding "is effectively the same as that announced in Kolstad").
146. 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).
147. Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Patterson,90 F.3d at 944).
148. 97 F.3d 488 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
149. Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1213 (quoting Splunge, 97 F.3d at 491).
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2. Kolstad Did Not Define "Good-FaithEffort"
Another problem with Kolstad is that the Court provides no definitive standard
for determining what constitutes a good-faith effort to comply with federal antidiscrimination laws. 5 The Court gave employers the minimal hint that they
should adopt and enforce anti-discrimination policies and should educate their
personnel about what is and is not permitted under the law."5 However, the Court
does not clarify whether these three steps alone are sufficient for employers to meet
the good-faith-compliance defense.
a) Response to FarragherEllerthAffirmative Defense Is Informative in Determining What Constitutes a Kolstad Good-FaithDefense
Just as it did in Kolstad, the Supreme Court left similar questions unanswered
when it created the FaragherlEllerthaffirmative defense to vicarious liability for the
For example, the
sexually harassing conduct of supervisory employees."
FaragherlEllerthaffirmative defense requires a showing that the employer exercised
"reasonable care" in preventing harassment and that the complaining employee acted
"unreasonably" in failing to take advantage of the employer's grievance policy."'
However, the Court did not clarify what constitutes reasonable care by the employer
or what constitutes unreasonable failure by the employee." Looking to various
responses to these unanswered Faragher/Ellerthquestions provides a starting point
for answering the Kolstad question of what constitutes good-faith compliance with
Title VII.
Abrief examination of Faragherand Ellerth will facilitate this discussion. The
Supreme Court decided both cases on the same day and set forth new standards
clarifying employer liability in sexual harassment cases. The Court held that
employers could be subject to vicarious liability for the sexually harassing conduct
of supervisors with immediate authority over complaining employees. 5 However,
in cases in which the alleged harassment does not result in a tangible employment
action, the employer may invoke a two-step affirmative defense to liability by
showing: "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee

150. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999) (complaining that
Kolstad did not outline good-faith standards); see also John A. Beranbaum, Kolstad v. American Dental
Association: Punitive Damages Under Title Vt!, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 18, 1999 (concluding that Supreme
Court will likely have to take up issue of punitive damages under Title VII again to clarify numerous
questions Kolstad left unanswered); "Good Faith Effort" Defense, supra note 106, at 309 ("Kolstad
provides no definitive standard for determining what constitutes good-faith compliance.").
151. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544-46.
dissenting) (criticizing
152. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,766 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
majority for setting forth an affirmative defense "that the Court barely attempts to define"); Susan
Webber Wright, Uncertainties in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 11, 19 (1999)
(identifying problem of uncertainty in standard set forth by Ellerth and Faragher).
153. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998).
154. Wright, supra note 152, at 19.
155. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763-65; Faragher,524 U.S. at 805-09.
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unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.""
In Ellerth, the plaintiff filed a sexual harassment claim against the employer,
alleging that a supervisor's suggestive comments forced her constructive discharge." 7 The supervisor's comments did not result in tangible employment actions
but were considered employment threats.'
The plaintiff never reported the
harassment to her employer through its formal complaint procedure. 5 '
In Faragher,the plaintiff lifeguard brought a Title VII complaint against the city,
claiming two supervisors engaged in activities that created a sexually hostile
atmosphere."w Such activities included offensive touching and lewd comments
directed towards female lifeguards. 6' Like Ellerth, Faragher suffered no tangible
job detriment from the alleged harassment. The defendant had an anti-discrimination
policy, but did not post or otherwise publish the policy at the employee's work
site. 6'
In determining the extent of the employers' vicarious liability for the harassing
conduct of supervisors in both cases, the Court looked to the common law rules of
agency. 63 In an effort to merge recognized agency principles with the purpose of
Title VII, the Court found it necessary to establish a new standard for employer
liability in sexual harassment cases involving actionable hostile environments.'
As stated supra, this new standard and its accompanying affirmative defense left
employers with several questions."
The EEOC recognized the holes in the FaragherlEllerthaffirmative defense and
responded with suggested employer guidelines. 67 The guidelines define
"reasonable care" as consisting of formulating, distributing, and enforcing companywide anti-harassment policies"s that include certain essential elements.'" The
guidelines also encourage employers to write the policies in language that all
employees can easily comprehend, to post the policies in high-traffic areas within
the workplace, and to include the policies in employee handbooks.'
156. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see Faragher,524 U.S. at 806.
157. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749.
158. Id. at 747-48.
159. Id.
160. Faragher,524 U.S. at 780.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 781-82.
163. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755-57.; Faragher,524 U.S. at 792-94 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY (1957) because Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 447 U.S. 57 (1986) found this an
appropriate starting point for discussing employer vicarious liability).
164. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (stating the purpose as "designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms").
165. Id. (stating that the new standard accommodates both agency principles and Title Vlrs deterrent
policies).
166. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
167. EEOC Notice, supra note 11, § V(C).
168. Id. § V(C).
169. See supra note 11.
170. EEOC Notice, supra note 1I, § V(C)(1).
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These EEOC guidelines do not apply exclusively to sexual harassment"' and
therefore provide guidance in answering the Kolstad question of what constitutes a
good-faith effort to comply with Title VII. Employers can use the EEOC guidelines
in implementing corporate policy statements regarding the elimination of all forms
of discrimination and harassment in their work environments." According to the
EEOC, the policy statements should define discrimination and harassment; prohibit
such as a matter of company policy; identify internal corporate mechanisms for
complaints and redress for aggrieved employees; allow employees to submit
complaints above their immediate supervisors; and, as a matter of policy, prohibit
retaliation and reprisals against any complaining parties.'" If employers take the
steps suggested in the EEOC guidelines when drafting company policies and follow
the guidelines' suggestions for proper enforcement of these policies, employers can
use this as evidence of a good-faith effort to comply with Title VII in order to
invoke the Kolstad good-faith defense.
Removed from the context of the EEOC response to Ellerth and Faragher,these
decisions themselves help clarify the Kolstad defense.'74 For example, Ellerth and
Faragheroffer "guidance in cases such as hostile environment harassment cases
where the defendant has an anti-discrimination policy, has trained its supervisors not
to discriminate, and has no reason to believe that discriminatory decisions were
being made at a supervisory level.""" Such evidence in hostile environment cases
in which an aggrieved employee seeks punitive damages would demonstrate that the
employer acted "in good faith based on reasonable grounds that it was not
discriminating""'7 and thus should serve as a defense to punitive liability. The
same evidence would probably serve as a sufficient defense to punitive liability in
other contexts under Title VII as well."r
For the foregoing reasons, the EEOC need not respond to the Kolstad decision
with further guidelines for employers. Instead, employers and employment law
attorneys need only look to the guidelines already in place as well as other sources
explored within this Note to learn what constitutes a good-faith effort to comply
with Title VII.

171. See supra note 15.
172. Mantman, supra note 2.
173. Id.
174. Johnson, supra note 19, at 83, 106 (raising Kolstad in the context of what the Supreme Court
should do in deciding this case).
175. Id. at 106 (suggesting a less expensive good-faith defense than the one adopted in Kolstad).
176. Id.
177. Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating
three reasons why Ellerth and Faragherapply to cases of racial harassment: first, Faragherencouraged
harmonizing standards of racial and sexual harassment; second, precedent suggests that employer-liability
standards are the same for race and sex-based discrimination; finally, Ellerth and Faragherinterpreted
same statutory language that applies to racial harassment cases).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:181

b) Differences Between Faragher/Ellerthand Kolstad Exemplify Importance of
Kolstad
Although the Supreme Court followed the same path in Kolstad as it previously
laid down in Faragherand Ellerth by stressing the prophylactic purpose of the Civil
Rights Act, the Court went further in Kolstad than it had in the previous decisions.
For example, the Court exempted cases resulting in "tangible job actions""' from
the FaragherlEllerthaffirmative defense" but made no such exception to the
Kolstad good-faith defense." To avoid punitive liability under Kolstad, employers
need only demonstrate that the discriminatory conduct of which the plaintiff
complains conflicts with the employer's efforts to comply with anti-discrimination
laws, regardless of the form and result of the discriminatory conduct. Therefore,
even though an employer sued by an employee who experienced a tangible job
action as a result of sexual harassment cannot assert the FaragherlEllerth
affirmative defense to vicarious liability, that same employer can escape punitive
liability under Kolstad. Accordingly, the Kolstad defense will entertain wider use
than will the FaragherlEllerthaffirmative defense.
A further difference between the application of the FaragherlEllerthaffirmative
defense and the Kolstad good-faith defense is that each defense applies to different
types of employees. The FaragherlEllerthdefense shields employers from the
vicarious liability of its supervisors' conduct whereas Kolstad applies to the conduct
of managerial employees."' An employee qualifies as a "supervisor" if he or she
has the authority to undertake tangible employment decisions against other
employees or has the authority to direct other employees' daily work activities."'
This special authority exercised by supervisors vests them with an enhanced
capacity to harass other employees," thus justifying employer liability for
supervisor conduct. '"
No such concise definition of "managerial employee" exists."' Instead, the
determination of managerial capacity involves a fact-intensive inquiry, requiring the

178. A tangible employment action is defined as "a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
179. ld. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998) ("No affirmative defense
is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action.").
180. In fact, Kolstad itself arose from a tangible job action - failure of the ADA to promote
Kolstad based on her sex. Accordingly, the Court did not exempt such tangible actions from the Kolstad
defense.
181. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n., 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
182. EEOC Notice, supra note 11, § III(A).
183. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
184. Id. at 763-64 (identifying small number of supervisors within workplace as another justification
because employers can more readily guard against their misbehavior).
185. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2000) ("[Clommon
law principles do not provide a precise definition of 'managerial capacity'... ."); JAMES D. GHIARDI &
JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNMVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 24.05, at 20 (2000) ("Unfortunately, no
good definition of what constitutes a 'managerial capacity' has been found.").
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court to "review the type of authority that the employer has given the employee, the
amount of discretion that the employee has in what is done and how it is
accomplished.""M At a minimum, a managerial employee must be "important," but
need not be within the employer's "top management, officers or directors."'" It
seems, then, that the scope of "managerial" may be broader than that of "supervisorial," encompassing more employees so that Kolstad will enjoy wider
application than the FaragherlEllerthaffirmative defense in this context as well.
Another distinction between the Kolstad good-faith defense and the Faragheri
Ellerth affirmative defense is that Kolstad does not require any action or inaction
by the complaining employee. The second tier of the FaragherEllerthaffirmative
defense requires a showing that the complaining employee "unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer."'" Kolstad merely requires the employer to demonstrate that it made
a good-faith effort to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws. There is no
similar second tier requirement. Therefore, the Kolstaddefense will prove easier for
employers to invoke and will lead to its increased use.
The three foregoing distinctions explain why courts may invoke the Kolstad
defense more frequently than the FaragherlEllerthdefense and demonstrate the need
to clarify the boundaries and requirements of the new defense. Although Faragher
and Ellerth created a complete defense to liability while Kolstad merely created a
defense to punitive liability, Kolstads importance may rise to the level of Faragher
and Ellerth due to the fact that more employers are likely to invoke the Kolstad
defense than the FaragherlEllerth defense. Also, employers' pocketbooks and bank
accounts may consider the Kolstad defense fairly significant considering that it will
allow them to escape paying awards that could reach as high as $300,000.'"
E. What Constitutes a Good-FaithEffort?
Kolstad provides employers and employment law attorneys with few examples
of what might, at a minimum, constitute a good-faith effort to comply with Title
VII. The Court merely suggested employers adopt and enforce anti-discrimination
policies and educate employees about federal prohibitions on workplace
discrimination."l The court that originally formulated the Kolstad defense
provided the following as examples of a good-faith attempt to comply with Title
VII: "hiring staff and managers sensitive to Title VII responsibilities, requiring

186. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 185, § 4.4(B)(2)(a), at 181.
187. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 543 (1999) (referring to definition of managerial
employer found in REsTATrrrN (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909); see also Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
166 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that "managerial capacity" requires the discriminating
employee be "highol up the corporate hierarchy" or that upper management "countenanced or approved"

the conduct).
188. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994) (setting cap on punitive damages awards between $50,000 and
$300,000, depending on the size of the employer).
190. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545.
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effective [Equal Employment Opportunity] training, or developing and using
objective hiring and promotion standards."''
Commentators also offer several suggestions for making a good-faith effort to
comply with federal law. One suggests that a "good-faith effort to comply" means
that employers should adopt and implement anti-discrimination policies and educate
their workforce and be ever-vigilant in monitoring the workplace to ensure that
policies are regularly and consistently applied." Speaking specifically about
company policies, another commentator suggests that such policies should lead any
observer - whether a disgruntled employee, a plaintiffs attorney, a judge, or a
jury - to conclude that the employer exemplifies good corporate citizenship and
demonstrates a serious commitment to preventing discrimination and harassment in
its workplace.'
The commentator suggests that, at a minimum, an employer's
compliance program should include the following:
(1) A state-of-the-art equal employment, anti-discrimination, and antiharassment policy and complaint procedure.
(2) An effective orientation program to educate all employees about
the company's policies and procedures.
(3) Exacting expectations of management behavior communicated to
and required of all supervisory personnel.
(4) Supplementary policy and procedures to implement the corporation's compliance with respect to discrimination and harassment.
(5) A relentless commitment to "best workplace practices" designed
4
to eliminate any problems of discrimination or harassment.'1
An employer should also communicate its commitment to Title VII to the
community in order to demonstrate good-faith efforts.'95
As discussed supra, EEOC guidelines offer further insight into complying with
Title VII.' However, the most informative insight comes from the lower courts
charged with applying the Kolstad defense.' Thus far, courts have indicated that
adopting written company policies and following such policies may be sufficient to
demonstrate a good-faith defense, 9' but that actually implementing the written
191. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d at 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (dissent).
192. See High Court, supra note 7, at 6 (interpreting Kolstad defense); "GoodFaith Effort" Defeme,
supra note 106, at 308 ("[Aln employer asserting the defense will have to show that it has specific
policies in place that focus particularly on the requirements of Title VII or the ADA.... It will also be
important for the defendant to show that managerial and supervisory employees have been trained in its
nondiscrimination policies and are familiar with how to apply them in the workplace.").
193. Maatman, supra note 2.
194. Id.
195. Swallows, supra note 3, at 14 (suggesting that a company's commitment to equal employment
opportunities should be communicated in job vacancy announcements, on employment applications and
job descriptions, in employers' policies, and during periodic employee and management training sessions).
196. See discussion supra Part llI.D.2.a.
197. Lewis, supra note 3 (indicating that Kolstad leaves it up to circuit courts to determine what
constitutes good-faith effort and that the courts can look to Faragherand Ellerth in making this
determination).
198. White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 P.2d 944, 947 n.2 (Cal. 1999) (noting that "if a company has a
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policies more conclusively demonstrates good faith."' Other indications of a goodfaith attempt at compliance include "periodic publication to workers of the
employer's anti-harassment policy; an effective and practical grievance process; and
training sessions for workers, supervisors, and managers about how to recognize and
eradicate unlawful harassment."' Courts may even find that an employer made
good-faith efforts at compliance despite delays in responding to employee
complaints."'
Courts have also found that certain actions do not measure up to a good-faith
effort to comply with federal law. For example, a written anti-discrimination policy,
without more, does not provide sufficient evidence of good faith.' A grievance
procedure for filing complaints does not sufficiently demonstrate good faith,' nor
does seeking legal counsel on employment issues.' One court has also rejected
the converse of the good-faith defense - thatfailing to make a good-faith attempt
to avoid discrimination in the workplace automatically subjects the employer to
punitive damages.' Essentially, "[flor the good-faith exception to apply, there
must be a policy of nondiscrimination both in words and in practice. '

written company policy that specifically forbids retaliation against employees who testify at
unemployment hearings may operate to limit corporate liability for punitive damages, as long as the
employer implements the written policy in good faith"); Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 521 S.E.2d 331,
352 (W. Va. 1999) (Workman, J., dissenting) (finding good-faith effort where employer adopted a
generous medical leave policy and replaced the employee in accordance with the policy). But see Miller
v. Kenworth, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (noting that although "adoption of
antidiscrimination policies is... important... a policy alone is not sufficient as a matter of law to
establish an employer's good faith").
199. Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 670 (Ist Cir. 2000) ("[A] written non-discrimination
policy is one indication of an employer's efforts to comply with Title VII. But a written statement,
without more, is insufficient... A defendant must also show that efforts have been made to implement
its anti-discrimination policy, through education of its employees and active enforcement of its
mandate.").
200. Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 735 A.2d 548, 556 (NJ. 1999).
201. Dhynev. MeinersThriftway, Inc., 184 F.3d 983,988 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding good-faith efforts;
to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws despite excessive delay in taking action on complaints
of harassment).
202. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding written policy
alone insufficient to insulate an employer from vicarious punitive liability).
203. Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding
evidence that employer encourages employees to file grievances does not suffice to establish good-faith
compliance when counter evidence shows that management did not effectively respond to grievances);
Blackmon v. Pinkerton See. & Investigative Servs., 182 F.3d 629,636 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding good-faith
defense requires prompt investigation of complaints and effective remedial action but half-hearted
responses do not suffice).
204. Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 2d 228, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that retaining
legal counsel on employment issues does not establish as matter of law a good-faith effort when evidence
suggests that employer disregarded counsel's advice).
205. Scott v. Ameritex Yam, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587, 598 (D.S.C. 1999); see also Kostad's "Good
Faith" Defense, supranote 13, at 47 ("While good faith efforts to comply with federal anti-discrimination
laws prevent employers from being liable for punitive damages, their failure to take such steps does not
make liability for punitive damages automatically imputable to them.").
206. Copley v. BAX Global, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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IV. Conclusion
As demonstrated in this note, the Kolstad Court chose a standard for awarding
punitive damages in employment discrimination and harassment cases that conflicts
with the underlying purpose of Title VII. The Court, however, recognized and
remedied this defect by creating the good-faith-compliance defense to punitive
liability. This defense advances the preventive purpose of Title VII by rewarding
those employers who initiate a proactive approach to workplace discrimination and
harassment.
Although the Court left ambiguous what actions employers must take to
demonstrate a good-faith effort to comply with Title VII, employers and
employment law attorneys can draw from numerous sources to determine the
necessary steps. From the research contained herein, a good-faith effort seems to
begin with adoption of clear anti-discrimination/anti-harassment policies within the
workplace. The policies should define discrimination and harassment and explicitly
prohibit such conduct within the workplace. The policies should also provide
aggrieved employees an avenue for complaining without fear of retaliation.
Employers not only need to adopt such policies, but also need to distribute the
policies to employees, educate employees on their obligations and protections under
the policies, post the policies within the workplace, include the policies in employee
handbooks, and encourage employees to follow the policies.
As long as courts find good-faith compliance in employer actions such as the
ones described above, the good-faith defense will prove effective in striking a fair
balance between employee rights and employer liability. However, courts that either
set the compliance mark too high or too low will destroy the preventive benefit of
the Kolstad defense.
Effective anti-discrimination workplace policies are now a company's best and
most essential defense against a claim for punitive damages in the post-Kolstad era.
Kolstad has the potential to make anti-discrimination programs the norm in
workplaces across the United States and eventually result in complete fulfillment of
the deterrent purpose underlying Title VII.
Tamara Schiffner
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